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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing consensus in the literature on the applicability of the jus ad bellum 
to cyber-attacks that the effects caused by an attack should determine whether the 
attack constitutes a use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) or an armed attack 
giving rise to self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter). This article argues that this 
approach is inconsistent and dangerous. The push to include cyber-attacks in the 
existing framework on the use of force disregards the consensus on other non-
conventional uses of force like economic sanctions and damage caused by espionage, 
and it is premised on dangerous hyperbole from in sensational media stories. Such an 
approach ignores serious practical problems regarding the attribution of cyber-attacks 
and would open the door wide for abuse. There is no reason to weaken the effectiveness 
of a deliberately narrow system on the use of force based on dystopian scenarios. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cyberwar1 and computer network attacks have had a lot of attention and interest in the recent years. 
The concerted Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against a wide range of Estonian 
websites, the well-documented Stuxnet worm, and the partially related revelations concerning the 
United States’ mass espionage activities by Edward Snowden have made it clear to governments, 
academics, journalists and the wider public that ‘cyber’ is an area that matters when it comes to the 
wars of the future. 
                                                 
1 While the tendency of journalists and politicians to use the prefix ‘cyber’ for almost everything is rightly looked down 
upon in Computer Science circles, it has become almost a convention to speak of ‘cyber-attacks’ and ‘cyberwar’. 
Accordingly, these words will be used in the following article.  
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Politicians are not shy of drastic comparisons in this regard. Leading American officials like 
Richard Clarke, the then National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter-
terrorism with the National Security Council,2 and Leo Panetta, the former Director of the CIA and 
at that time the US Secretary of Defence,3 have referred to the threat of a ‘cyber [or electronic] Pearl 
Harbour’ that is looming over the United States. Many states have set up cyber divisions within their 
armed forces, establishing both offensive and defensive capabilities.4 
Obviously, this matter was not a central concern to the creators of the UN Charter or of the 
Geneva Conventions (even though computers and computer aided espionage played a big role in the 
Second World War), so a much debated topic at the moment is how cyber-attacks fit into the 
international legal framework of warfare. A plethora of articles and a number of books have already 
been written on the applicability of jus ad bellum (the rules on the legality of a war itself),5 of jus in 
                                                 
2 Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-
Defense’ (2002) 38 Stanford Journal of International Law 207, 211. 
3 ‘Leon Panetta Warns of “Cyber Pearl Harbour”’, BBC News (12 October 2012) www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
19923046 (accessed 30 June 2015). 
4 Aerie J Schaap, ‘Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use under International Law’ (2009) 64 The Air Force 
Law Review 121, 127 et seq; Richard Stiennon, ‘A Short History of Cyber Warfare’ in James A Green (ed), Cyber Warfare: 
A Multidisciplinary Analysis (Routledge, 2015) 7, 22–7. 
5 See, e.g. Jason Barkham, ‘Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force’ (2001) 34 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 57; Marco Benatar, ‘The Use of Cyber Force: Need for Legal 
Justification’ (2009) 1 Goettingen Journal of International Law 375; Lianne J M Boer, ‘Restating the Law “As It Is”: On 
the Tallinn Manual and the Use of Force in Cyberspace’ (2013) 5 Amsterdam Law Forum 4; Davis Brown, ‘A Proposal 
for an International Convention To Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict’ (2006) 47 Harvard 
International Law Journal 179; Gary Brown and Keira Poellet, ‘The Customary International Law of Cyberspace’ (2012) 
Strategic Studies Quarterly 126; Russell Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’ 
(2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 211; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense’ in 
Michael N Schmitt and Brian T O’Donnell (eds), Computer Network Attack and International Law (Naval War College, 
2002) 99; Jenny Dröge, ‘Cyber Warfare: Challenges for the Applicability of the Traditional Laws of War Regime’ (2010) 
48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 486; David P Fidler, ‘Recent Developments and Revelations Concerning Cybersecurity and 
Cyberspace: Implications for International Law’ (2012) 16(22) ASIL Insights, 
www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/22/recent-developments-and-revelations-concerning-cybersecurity-and 
(accessed 26 May 2017); Dieter Fleck ‘Searching for International Rules Applicable to Cyberwarfare – A Critical First 
Assessment of the New Tallinn Manual’ (2013) 18 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 331; Matthew Hoisington, 
‘Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right to Self-Defense’ (2009) 32 Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review 439; Jensen (n 2); Herbert S Lin, ‘Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force’ (2010) 
4 Journal of National Security Law and Policy 63; Reese Nguyen, ‘Navigating Jus ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare’ 
(2013) 101 California Law Review 1079; Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security without Cyber War’ (2012) 17 Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law 187; Titiriga Remus, ‘Cyber Attacks and International Law of Armed Conflicts; a “Jus ad 
Bellum” Perspective’ (2013) 8 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 179; Marco Roscini, Cyber 
Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 43–116; Schaap (n 4); Michael N 
Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework’ 
(1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885; Michael N Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum 
Revisited’  (2011) 56 Villanova Law Review 569; Michael N Schmitt, ‘International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech 
and the Tallinn Manual Justaposed’ (2012) 54 Harvard International Law Journal Online 13; Scott J Shackleford, ‘From 
Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law’ (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International 
Law 192; P W Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford 
University Press, 2014); Nicholas Tsagourias ‘Cyber attacks, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Attribution’ (2012) 17 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 229; Anna Wortham, ‘Should Cyber Exploitation Ever Constitute a Demonstration 
of Hostile Intent That May Violate UN Charter Provisions Prohibiting the Threat or Use of Force?’ (2011) 64 Federal 
Communications Law Journal 643. 
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bello (the rules governing the conduct in a war),6 and some articles have been dedicated to the 
applicability of international criminal law to cyber-attacks7. This article is focusing on jus ad bellum. 
While there is a wide range of different articles and books on this topic, and while these differ 
in their methodologies and argumentations, there appears to be one consensus in an overwhelming 
majority of them: what matters for the qualification of an attack under international law is not so 
much related to which methods were used to commit it, but what effect was caused by it. For the 
purpose of this article, this view is referred to as the ‘effects doctrine’. 
On first glance, the doctrine seems entirely logical. If a person gets hurt by someone else, it is 
ultimately not important to that person whether this was done by being pushed down a flight of stairs, 
by being intentionally run over with a car or by being beaten with a cricket bat. What matters would 
indeed be the effect – the amount of pain and the injuries caused. 
However, this article argues that the effects doctrine should not be applied to cyber-attacks. 
This application would endanger the traditional approach to the use of force in international law, 
would be inconsistent with the understanding of the use of force in other areas and would ultimately 
be quite dangerous. The cyberwar scenario that is reflected in many articles (both in mass media and 
in academic publications) is overstated, and a response not involving the traditional jus ad bellum 
would be more appropriate and more in line with the goals of the United Nations. 
To make this argument, the article will first, in section 2, summarise the effects doctrine. 
Section 3 will then go on to show that the doctrine is inconsistent, because an effects based approach 
has been rejected by the leading opinion on the use of force when it comes to economic sanctions. 
The way states treat espionage is similarly problematic, as states deliberately chose not to include 
                                                 
6 See, e.g. Jack M Beard, ‘Legal Phantoms in Cyberspace: The Problematic Status of Information as a Weapon and a 
Target under International Humanitarian Law’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 67; Yoram Dinstein, 
‘The Principle of Distinction and Cyber War in International Armed Conflicts’ (2012) 17 Journal or Conflict and Security 
Law 261; Cordula Droege, ‘Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of 
Civilians’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 533; Herbert Lin, ‘Cyber Conflict and International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 515; Jeremy Richmond, ‘Evolving Battlefields: Does 
Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need for Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 35 Fordham Journal of 
International Law 842; Lesley Swanson, ‘The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the 
2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict’ (2010) 32 Loyola LA International and Comparative Law Review 303; 
Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Deutschen Bundestages, ‘Anwendbarkeit des humanitären Völkerrechts auf 
Computernetzwerkoperationen und digitale Kriegsführung (Cyber Warfare)’ (2015) WD 2 – 3000 – 038/15; Kosmas 
Pipyros, Lilian Mitrou, Dimitris Gritzalis and  Theodoros Apostolopoulos, ‘Cyberoperations and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Review of Obstacles in Applying International Law Rules in Cyber Warfare’ (2016) 24 Information 
& Computer Security 38;; Roscini (n 5) 117–245; Michael N Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues’ 
(2011) 87 International Law Studies 89; Michael N Schmitt and Sean Watts, ‘The Decline of International Humanitarian 
Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare’ (2015) 50 Texas International Law Journal 189; Dan Saxon (ed), 
International Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013); Katharina Zielowski, 
‘Computernetzwerkoperationen und die Zusatzprotokolle zu den Genfer Abkommen’ (2008) 21 Humanitäres Völkerrecht 
– Informationsschriften 202. 
7 See, e.g. Chance Cammack ‘The Stuxnet Worm and Potential Prosecution by the International Criminal Court under the 
Newly Defined Crime of Aggression’ (2011) 20 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 303. 
 
 
4 
espionage and related incidents below a certain threshold in the use of force framework. The doctrine 
is further inconsistent in its application, as the effect does not only depend on the attack used, but also 
on the victim state. The other major problems with the effects doctrine are practical: it is argued in 
section 4 that it is only in very rare instances possible to identify the perpetrator and to identify the 
intention of that perpetrator with a certainty that should be required for decisions of this magnitude.  
Finally, it is necessary to consider whether the danger that many writers portray is really existent. The 
article will therefore examine, in section 5, the examples used within the cyber war debate, and show 
that the different scenarios that are discussed in almost all academic (and media) elaborations of the 
topic are unrealistic or hyperbolic. Basing a potential extension of the framework governing the use 
of force on hyperboles and unrealistic fear is not the most helpful contribution to making the world a 
safer place. Instead, the conclusion will argue, we should rely first and foremost on an international 
effort to improve computer security, and on responses below the use of force threshold. The cyberwar 
debate needs to leave the realms of the military. 
 
2. The effects doctrine 
 
The basic rules of the international legal framework on the use of force seem quite straightforward 
and are probably well known to any reader of this journal. Therefore, the summary in this section will 
be very brief. 
Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UNC), the ‘use of force’ and the threat 
of that use are prohibited. It is widely accepted that this article also reflects customary international 
law, and it is seen as a provision of jus cogens, a norm of international law that cannot be overridden 
by treaty or custom.8 Besides the now obsolete case of the use of force against former enemy states 
in Article 107 UNC, the Charter allows only two exceptions from this prohibition: authorisation by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter and self-defence under Article 51 UNC. The 
latter is, according to the Charter, only permissible ‘if an armed attack occurs’. 
The UN Charter was written in 1945, in the immediate aftermath of the two world wars. What 
the founders of the United Nations had in mind when they wrote the words ‘use of force’ and ‘armed 
attack’ were no doubt images like Hitler’s tanks driving over the Polish border or Japanese planes 
bombing Pearl Harbour. Therefore, the question of whether the typing of a string of commands into 
the terminal window of a computer can constitute a use of force or an armed attack is a complex one. 
                                                 
8 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14, para 190. See also Oliver Dörr ‘Use of Force, Prohibition of’ (2015) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, online version, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL, para 1 (accessed 19 April 2017); Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn 2008) 30. 
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After the topic of cyberwar became more prominent in the media, a number of writers started 
to assess in how far these actions are covered by the current international legal framework. Most 
importantly, an ‘International Group of Experts’ convened in Tallinn at the invitation of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to write the ‘Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare’, or ‘Tallinn Manual’.  The Manual was originally published in 2013,9 
and then, in 2017, was notably revised, expanded and updated (with the 2017 version being coined 
the ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0’).10  
Although the Tallinn Manual itself points out that it ‘is not an official document, but rather 
the product of two separate endeavours [i.e. the production of the Tallinn Manual and the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0] undertaken by groups of independent experts acting solely in their personal capacity’,11 
and that it ‘does not represent the views of NATO’,12 the Manual has had considerable influence. 
Michael Schmitt, the Manual’s General Editor, claims it reflects ‘teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists’,13 a direct reference to one of the sources of international law as listed in Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Much of the Manual is based strongly on 
Schmitt’s previous writings,14 in particular his article ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force 
in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework’ written in 1999.15 
The most important part of the Manual concerning the jus ad bellum is contained in Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 Rules 69 (Rule 11 in the 2013 version) and 71 (Rule 13 in the 2013 version), assessing 
how cyber operations can be a use of force (Rule 69) and an armed attack (Rule 71). Rule 69 borrows 
a phrase used by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Nicaragua judgment (albeit in a 
different context): the ‘scale and effects’ of the attack should be the qualifying factor.16 The Manual 
distinguishes two kinds of effects: first, it unambiguously states that acts that ‘injure or kill persons 
or damage or destroy objects are uses of force’.17  For operations below that threshold, the Manual 
suggests a set of criteria that ‘states are likely to consider’18 when assessing if it there has been a use 
of force: severity (the act should constitute more than a ‘mere inconvenience or irritation’); 
immediacy (the faster the effect of a cyber operation manifests itself, the more likely it is that it is a 
use of force); directness (the effects should be caused by the operation itself, not by other factors); 
                                                 
9 Michael N Schmitt (gen ed), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
10 Michael N Schmitt (gen ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd edn 2017). 
11 Ibid, 2. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Schmitt, ‘International Law in Cyberspace’ (n 5) 15. 
14 Boer (n 5) 6. 
15 Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law’ (n 5) 885. 
16 Tallinn Manual 2.0 (n 10) 331. 
17 Ibid, 333 (emphasis added). 
18 Ibid. 
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invasiveness (the more secure the system infiltrated, the higher the likeliness of the act being a use of 
force); measurability (the consequences should be apparent); military character; state involvement; 
and the illegality of the act.19 
While not every one of these criteria is reflected in every journal article on the topic, the 
general idea that the effects of an operation determine whether it constitutes a use of force has found 
the widespread appreciation of many academics,20 and is considered the ‘majority view’.21 Singer and 
Friedman write ‘[i]f your power plant explodes in a fiery blast that kills thousands, whether the cause 
was an actual bomb or logic bomb is not a major distinguishing factor’.22 
The Tallinn Manual applies the same principle to Article 51 UNC as well. According to Rule 
71 of the Manual, decisive for the question whether a cyber-attack is an ‘armed attack’, allowing 
states to act in self-defence, are again ‘scale and effects’.23 The ICJ, in its Nicaragua decision, 
distinguished an ‘armed attack’ from the ‘use of force’ by stating that only the ‘most grave forms’ of 
the use of force should constitute an armed attack.24 The requirement of gravity has been taken up 
again by the Court in the Oil Platforms case.25 It also is supported by many scholars,26 but is strongly 
disputed by others, most notably by American officials.27 
Therefore, the Tallinn Manual takes note of some disagreements within the group of experts 
on the scale and effects required, but makes clear that the experts decided unanimously that ‘some 
cyber operations may be sufficiently grave to warrant classifying them as an “armed attack”’.28 As 
with Rule 69, acts that result in the death or injury of persons or in the destruction of property do, in 
the eyes of the group of experts, qualify as armed attacks.29 Many scholars have agreed in principle 
with this position.30 Hoisington, for example, sees it as necessary for deterrence that states are allowed 
to use self-defence against cyber-attacks ‘without being restrained by outdated interpretations of 
international law governing the use of force’.31 Jensen goes even further and write that ‘in the age of 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 333–6. 
20 See, e.g. Brown (n 5) 187; Wortham (n 5) 651; Barkham (n 5) 79; Roscini (n 5) 62; Remus (n 5) 188 et seq; Shackleford 
(n 5) 231. 
21 Johann-Christoph Woltag, ‘Cyber Warfare’ (2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online 
version, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL, para 8 (accessed 19 April 2017). 
22 Singer and Friedman (n 5) 125. 
23 Tallinn Manual 2.0 (n 10) 339. 
24 Nicaragua (merits) (n 8) para 191. 
25 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (merits) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, 
para 51. 
26 See, e.g. Albrecht Randelzhofer and Georg Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd edn 2012) para 20. 
27 See, e.g. the article by the then State Department Legal Adviser: William H Taft, ‘Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms 
Decision’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 295, 300 et seq. 
28 Tallinn Manual 2.0 (n 10) 340. 
29 Ibid, 341. 
30 Tsagourias (n 5) 231; Woltag (n 21) para 9; Brown (n 5) 188; Barkham (n 5) 80; Remus (n 5) 188 et seq; Schaap (n 4) 
147 et seq; Shackleford (n 5) 237. 
31 Hoisington (n 5) 454. See also Jensen (n 2) 228. 
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instantaneous computer lethality’, states should also have the right to use anticipatory self-defence 
against imminent cyber-attacks.32 This should, in his eyes, even apply to attacks below the ‘armed 
attack’ threshold (relying on the theory that Article 51 UNC is only a codified version of a wider 
customary right to self-defence).33 Roscini is a bit more careful and qualifies that ‘only large scale 
cyber attacks on critical infrastructures that result in significant physical damage or human losses 
comparable to those of an armed attack with conventional weapons’ allow self-defence,34 but 
ultimately, his view also stands firmly within the effects doctrine. 
It needs to be pointed out that while a response in self-defence must be proportionate to the 
attack, it is not limited to the same means/methods as that attack. A proportionate response to a cyber-
attack could, according to one scholar, consist, for example, of ‘precision bombing against known 
cyber warfare operation centres’.35 
This discussion is by no means limited to the academic world. A number of states, including 
the United States,36 the United Kingdom,37 and Germany,38 have made it clear that they are willing to 
respond to cyber-attacks on critical military infrastructure with military force.39 The former President 
of the United States, Barack Obama, explicitly referred to the right of self-defence when talking about 
cyber threats and stated that the US ‘reserve[s] the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic’ to defend the country.40 Similarly, the Secretary-General of 
NATO has pointed out that in his view a cyber-attack can trigger collective self-defence under Article 
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.41 
The proponents of the effects doctrine typically list two older sources as support for their 
position. Obviously, cyber warfare is not the first scenario that does not quite fit into the wording of 
Articles 2(4) and 51 UNC. Ian Brownlie famously considered attacks involving the use of non-
                                                 
32 Jensen (n ) 221. See Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited’ (n 5) 593. 
33 Jensen (n 2) 229. 
34 Marco Roscini, ‘World Wide Warfare – Jus ad bellum and the Use of Cyber Force’ (2010) 14 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 85, 130. 
35 Schaap (n 4) 149. See also Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited’ (n 5) 594. 
36 US Department of Defense, ‘The DoD Cyber Strategy’ (2015) www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf, 11 (accessed 24 February 2017). 
37 HM Government, ‘National Cyber Security Strategy 2016–2021’ (2016) 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.
pdf, 47, 49 et seq (accessed 5 March 2017). 
38See Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ‘Weissbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der 
Bundeswehr’ (2016) 
www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/UlRvcjZYSW1RcEVHaUd4cklzQU4yNWFvejhLbjVyYnR1OCt3ZlU1N09FVkZoY
mR4Sjljb1E2UW9BdC9qQ3U1bmVEck9CbDgvcUFZaUhSL1dSSFA0alRxelpqQ3dyK1E3LzB4N0lXQ0lhcHM9/Wei
ssbuch2016_barrierefrei.pdf, 36, 56, 65 (accessed 24 February 2017).  
39 Roscini (n 5) 74 et seq. 
40 ‘International Strategy for Cyber Space: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World’, White House (May 
2011) www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf, 14 (accessed 20 
July 2015). 
41 Press Conference by Jens Stoltenberg (14 June 2016), www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_132349.htm (accessed 8 
February 2017). 
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conventional weapons like chemical or biological substances, and concluded that the ‘destruction to 
life and property’ should form the litmus test for asserting a use of force and an armed attack.42 
Likewise, the ICJ held in its advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons that Articles 2(4) and 51 UNC ‘do 
not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed’.43 
The Court explicitly refers to new weapon systems when writing on the applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law: 
 
However, it cannot be concluded ... that the established principles and rules of humanitarian 
law applicable in armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would 
be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in 
question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare 
and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future.44 
 
3. The inconsistency of the effects doctrine 
 
Basing the evaluation of cyber-attacks merely on their effect is, however, inconsistent with regards 
to other potential attacks that could be committed by states, most notably the use of economic force 
and the grey area of espionage and sabotage. It is, further, problematic that the evaluation of the 
effects of a cyber-attack depends strongly on the victim state. 
 
3.1. Economic sanctions 
One of the longest debates on the non-conventional uses of force is the use of economic force, a topic 
that has been discussed since the San Francisco Conference. The leading opinion among politicians 
and scholars about the use of economic force has always been that the use of economic force is not 
included in Article 2(4), and even less so in Article 51,45 although there is a notable difference between 
writers from developed countries (who tend to agree with the proposition that economic force is not 
‘force’) and writers from developing countries (who tend to disagree with this position).46 
The strongest argument to include the use of economic and political force in the scope of 
Article 2(4) is a textual one: it is remarkable that the authors of the Charter chose to use the rather 
general words ‘use of force’ without further qualification in Article 2(4), even though the more 
                                                 
42 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon Press, 1963) 362. 
43 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 40. 
44 Ibid, para 86. 
45 See, e.g. Dörr (n 8) para 11. 
46 Christine Gray, ‘The Use of Force and the International Legal Order’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 589, 592. 
 
9 
specific phrase ‘armed force’ is used three times elsewhere in the Charter (in the preamble and in the 
Articles 41 and 46). The words ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 of the Charter also signify a distinction 
to the mere ‘use of force’. Asserting that ‘force’ means ‘armed force’ would, according to Paust and 
Blaustein, equate to reading something in the text that is not there.47 
However, this argument is usually rejected based upon the travaux préparatoires of the 
Charter: the San Francisco Conference rejected a Brazilian proposal to explicitly include economic 
coercion within the use of force (‘ou aux menaces ou à l’émploi de mesures d’ordre économique 
incompatibles’).48 The Friendly Relations Declaration, one of the General Assembly Resolutions 
frequently used as an authoritative interpretation of Article 2(4), reminds states in its preamble that 
they have a duty to refrain from military, economic and political coercion in their international 
relations, but continues in its operative part to refer to force only in military terms.49 It is assumed 
that the exclusion of economic uses of force also extends to the prohibition of the use of force in 
customary international law.50 
Despite the convincing points made by the proponents of the textual interpretation, the explicit 
rejection of the Brazilian proposal is a clear indication for the intentions of the majority of the San 
Francisco Conference. According to Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
preparatory work of the treaty can be taken into account when the normal interpretation ‘leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure’. As much as a wider perspective on ‘force’ might be desirable from 
a moral standpoint, such a perspective would ignore the intentions of the Charter’s drafters. There is 
also nothing in the subsequent practice of the majority of states that would indicate a change in this 
position. 
Ultimately, this debate does not have to be solved at great length in this article, as it is not the 
main subject of discussion here. Important for the purpose of this article, however, is the fact that 
many of the advocates of the effects doctrine, most notably the International Group of Experts that 
drafted the original version of the Tallinn Manual, uphold that the use of force in Article 2(4) does 
not include economic force. Rule 11 of the 2013 version of the Manual states that ‘whatever “force” 
may be, it is not mere economic or political coercion’.51 This wording was notably removed from the 
equivalent Rule 69 in the 2017 2.0 version52 – injecting some ambiguity into the view of the Manual’s 
                                                 
47 Jordan J Paust and Albert P Blaustein, ‘The Arab Oil Weapon – A Threat to International Peace’ (1974) 68 American 
Journal of International Law 410, 415 et seq. 
48 UNCIO VI, 334, 609; Albrecht Randelzhofer and Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, 
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authors on this point – although it remains clear that the Manual still broadly ties its understanding of 
‘force’ in the cyber context to the traditional position that economic and political coercion are 
excluded from the scope of Article 2(4), at least as a presumptive approach.53  One of the best known 
writers on the use of force in international law, Yoram Dinstein, adopting the approach from the 2013 
version of the Manual, also rejects the application of Article 2(4) to economic measures, but states 
that computer attacks can be uses of force if ‘the end result [is] that violence occurs or is threatened’.54 
The 2013 version of the Tallinn Manual (although not the 2017 2.0 version) similarly states 
that ‘[c]yber operations that involve, or are otherwise analogous to, [economic or political coercion] 
are definitely not prohibited uses of force’.55 However, the original version of the Manual did not 
clarify the obvious contradiction: it held that cyber-attacks are uses of force if they ‘injure or kill 
persons or damage or destroy objects’,56 but economic coercion can never be a use of force, even 
though its effects can injure or kill persons (for example, in the case of an export ban on food or 
medication), and have done so in the past.57 
Economic warfare can have similar effects to those ascribed to cyber warfare, and it can have 
effects that are similar to armed attacks.58 Moreover, contrary to most of the cyber-attack scenarios 
described in the literature, most economic sanctions are very indiscriminate in their application. 
Contrary to attacking military targets via cyber means (for example, causing a malfunction that leads 
to a military airplane crashing), which would clearly be a use of force or an armed attack following 
the Tallinn Manual, an economic sanction can affect very large parts of the population, often with 
disproportionate harm falling on the poorest parts of it.59 Economic sanctions can also have similar 
effects on the freedom of information to the disruption of communication networks through a cyber-
attack.60 And economic sanctions can cause severe political distortion; one example is the ‘major 
contribution’ economic sanctions brought to the fall of Allende’s government in Chile.61 
It is certainly paradoxical to say that economic measures can never be uses of force, regardless 
of their effect, and that cyber-attacks can be uses of force because of their effect.62 The effects of 
economic attacks are often secondary rather than immediate, but so are the effects of many of the 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 5th edn 2012) 88. 
55 Tallinn Manual (n 9) 46. 
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57 See, e.g. Hartmut Brosche, ‘The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile: Economic and Political 
Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations’ (1974) 7(1) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 3, 4. 
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59 See, e.g. Seung-Whan Choi and Shali Luo, ‘Economic Sanctions, Poverty and International Terrorism: An Empirical 
Analysis’ (2013) 39 International Interactions 217, 220 et seq. 
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Sanctions on Media Openness’ (2010) 31(4) International Political Science Review 449. 
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cyber-attacks that have occurred or that are envisaged in the literature (a cyber-attack on an electrical 
grid, for example, is not destructive because of exploding transistors or burning relay stations, but 
because of the panic that it can cause).  This likely explains why the 2017 2.0 version of the Tallinn 
Manual removed the categorical statements to the effect that cyber-attacks that solely involve 
economic and political effects can never amount to a use of force, albeit that the apparent presumption 
that they will do not remains a feature of the Manual.63 
Dinstein’s point that ‘violence’ is the difference64 is not very convincing. It merely replaces 
one ambiguous and difficult to interpret word (‘force’) with another (‘violence’). It is not difficult to 
argue that the act of cutting off the supply of life saving medication to a population has a better claim 
to the label ‘violent’ than the remote destruction of a weapon system. 
Roscini tries to justify the different application of the effects doctrine by differentiating 
between the means and the target: sanctions use the economy ‘as a means of pressure’, cyber-attacks 
use it as the ‘target’.65 A cyber-attack against a stock exchange is, according to him, more comparable 
with its bombing than with economic sanctions.66 Again, this argument is not very convincing from 
the standpoint of an effect based approach on cyber-attacks. The devastating effects of a foreign power 
bombing the building of a stock exchange would not be the physical destruction of the building itself, 
but the economic distortion caused by the disruption of its operations. The economy would be used 
as a means of pressure in a very similar way to economic sanctions. This becomes even more obvious 
when looking at other writers who explicitly state that a cyber-attack on the financial system clearly 
constitutes an armed attack because of the following ‘massive disruption to the economic life of a 
State’.67 
Ultimately, if the effect of an attack were to be the decisive factor for both Article 2(4) UNC 
and Article 51 UNC, the approach to economic sanctions would have to be reshaped as well. The 
member states of the United Nations would need to come up with a clearer definition of these terms 
than the lowest common denominators that have been used for the Definition of Aggression and for 
the Friendly Relations Declaration. 
 
3.2. Espionage and sabotage 
Espionage and sabotage existed long before the proclaimed era of cyber warfare. The Cold War 
period, for example, is rich in anecdotes where covert action was used to cause physical damage. One 
of the earliest alleged computer attacks is the explosion of a Soviet pipeline in 1982 that, according 
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to a member of the National Security Council at the time, was caused by intentionally faulty American 
software stolen by the Soviets.68 During World War II, the United States’ Strategic Services released 
a ‘Simple Sabotage Field Manual’, which makes very entertaining reading, and gives handy tips to 
any potential saboteur on what weapons to use (‘salt, nails, candles, pebbles, thread, or any other 
materials he might normally be expected to possess as a householder or as a worker in his particular 
occupation’) or what excuse to make after dropping a wrench into an electric circuit (‘an air raid had 
kept you up the night before and you were half-dozing at work’).69 
Espionage is an area that is surprisingly unregulated in international law.70 States have always 
regarded espionage as a necessity and have hence never shown any interest in legally restricting these 
practices.71 Generally, it is accepted that spying is not considered a violation of international law,72 
but is an area that concerns domestic criminal law. There have been arguments that espionage in 
peacetime can constitute a violation of the rules of the territorial integrity of a state,73 but these are in 
the minority. There is also no convincing argument to consider espionage, a wide spread practice 
amongst states,74 as a violation of the prohibition of use of force or as an armed attack.75 It is even 
possible to speak about an ‘international norm of ignoring espionage activities’.76 
The situation with sabotage is slightly different. Sabotage, particularly in a terrorist context, 
can be seen as a violation of Article 2(4) and as an armed attack under Article 51. It is, however, 
unclear whether a certain threshold has to be crossed in the sabotage act (or when it comes to any 
state action in general – e.g. poisoning an individual, shooting via drone or disrupting production) 
and if there is a de minimis exception to Article 2(4). According to Ruys, ‘any deliberate projection 
of lethal force onto the territory of another state’ is enough to trigger Article 2(4).77 The existence of 
a de minimis exception has also been disputed in the context of terrorist attacks.78 
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In a reply to Ruys’ article, however, O’Connell rightfully argues that assuming such a wide 
scope of Article 2(4) (and, consequently, of Article 51) creates more opportunities for states to 
lawfully use force.79 The legal understanding of a targeted killing operation, for example, would be 
quite different whether it consists of a drone strike with anti-tank missiles or in the covert stabbing 
done by a secret agent – in one case states would consider it a use of force and in the other a violation 
of human rights laws and the non-intervention principle.80 When it comes to cyber-attacks, the Tallinn 
Manual applies a de minimis threshold as well: according to its authors, events ‘generating mere 
inconvenience or irritation will never’ be considered as a use of force.81 
This creates a constant source of inconsistency. As will be discussed in section 5, many of the 
discussed cyber cases and scenarios operate along the blurry line between espionage and warfare, and 
it is often only the invisible and scary nature of a cyber-attack that makes writers focus on Article 
2(4) rather than the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. 
 
3.3. The implications of differences between victim states 
Another problem with the effects based approach to cyber-attacks is that the development of the 
victim is decisive for the effects caused by a cyber-attack.82 This is obvious when looking at the 
descriptions of Estonia as ‘the most wired country in Europe’, which highlight that it is/will be 
disproportionately more affected by cyber-attacks than other states.83 A computer attack on a less 
developed country might not cross the line of a use of force following the effects doctrine as outlined 
in section 2.84 The same applies to a state like China, which has the capacity to cut itself off from the 
internet.85 
We, therefore, are in the situation where a cyber-attack on the United States could be seen as 
a violation of Article 2(4), while the same attack on Mongolia would not. This is certainly not the 
case with traditional kinetic attacks: a bombardment of a city would qualify as an armed attack 
regardless of whether we are talking about a modern city with skyscrapers or about a city consisting 
of wooden huts, and tanks shooting on army barracks would be considered an armed attack regardless 
of whether the army barracks contain modern fighter planes or rusty muskets. A legal framework that 
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reaches different evaluations depending on the technological development of the victim state is, 
therefore, at least problematic. 
 
4. Practical problems with the effects doctrine 
 
4.1. Difficulty in detecting the origin of the attack 
One of the biggest problems with expanding the framework on the use of force to include cyber-
attacks is that it is very easy to disguise origins on the internet. Even unsophisticated spammers and 
teenage attention seekers are able to use a wide variety of tactics readily available on the internet. 
Camouflaging the origins of an attack is not difficult,86 and is usually done by operating attacks from 
hijacked computers in other countries that are themselves accessed over multiple stages.87 The attacks 
on Estonia,88 for example, were launched from one million computers in over 100 countries.89 This 
would be even more of a problem if the attack came from the well-equipped cyber department of an 
actual army, as many of the scenarios envisage. The usual way to identify perpetrators of malevolent 
internet activity does not work here: most cybercriminals are found by ‘following the money’, but in 
the case of a cyberwar there is no money trail to be followed.90 
Even if it is possible to trace the state of origin, it will be even more difficult to figure out 
whether the attacks were really committed by state officials or by individuals – angry teenagers, 
‘hacktivists’, or cybercriminals, for example.91 This problem links back to a different debate on the 
use of force in international law: the question of attribution. According to the famous Nicaragua 
decision of the ICJ, it would be necessary to show ‘effective control’ of the state over individuals in 
order to attribute the attack to the state itself.92 The discussion about attribution stretches from this 
strict Nicaragua requirement on the one side to US President Bush’s infamous words ‘[w]e will make 
no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them’93 on the 
other. Most importantly, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia loosened the Nicaragua test slightly by changing ‘effective control’ to ‘overall control’, 
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a test which would include ‘participation in planning and supervision of military operations’,94 but 
did not manage to convince the ICJ of this standard.95 Discussing this in too much detail would go 
beyond the scope of this article, but in most cases it would be difficult to establish evidence for either 
effective or overall control of the state over a so-called patriotic hacker. The ‘harbouring’ test by 
former President Bush is already difficult to justify when it comes to terrorists with significant 
infrastructure (training camps, weapons etc),96 and certainly loses any argumentative force when 
‘harbouring’ means that someone is living in the territory of a state and uses a laptop and a connection 
to the internet. According to the majority of the authors, ‘harbouring’ needs to be coupled with other 
acts of ‘substantial support’,97 but this does not in any way make the issue of attribution easier or less 
prone to abuse. 
Rid and Buchanan write that ‘attribution is what states make of it’.98 There might be traces of 
evidence that can lead to certain perpetrators or certain states, but this analysis can suffer from 
perception bias.99 The detection of sources is often based on circumstantial evidence like the language 
or slang term used in source code,100 the geopolitical context,101 or, as in the case of Stuxnet, the 
sophistication and likely cost of the malware used.102 Even advocates of a robust right to self-defence 
against cyber-attacks admit that ‘technical attribution … can never be absolutely exact’.103 According 
to Singer and Friedman, the issue of attribution is ‘perhaps the most difficult problem’ in this 
complex.104 
Tsagourias therefore proposes that ‘intelligence and information analysis’ need to be used in 
addition to technical attribution.105 This, however, is a dangerous path. One only needs to recall the 
role that biased informers and unreliable intelligence played in the justification of the 2003 Iraq 
War.106 Intelligence information is by its very nature secret and impossible to scrutinise externally. 
Claims that unspecified sources have revealed that an attack was orchestrated by a foreign 
government are as unreliable as the technical attribution methods. 
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The danger of the effects doctrine becomes even clearer when looking at a more radical 
position: Jensen proposes that a state should be allowed to strike back even before the identity of the 
attacker is proven.107 Ultimately, he argues, these attacks are so dangerous that and instantaneous that 
the attribution of an attack would be ‘a luxury unavailable in the cyber attack era’.108 Schmitt argues 
in a similar vein when he writes about anticipatory self-defence against potential cyber-attacks: 
‘International law does not require either certainty or absolute precision in anticipating another state’s 
(or non-state actor’s) future actions’ – ‘reasonableness’ should be enough.109 If a state does not even 
have to fully explore where a cyber-attack comes from, but can defend itself on hunches and 
suspicions, the door to abuse is wide open. 
Neither Article 2(4) nor Article 51 of the Charter are very specific when it comes to the 
question of how much evidence is required to establish a use of force or an armed attack, but when 
interpreting a treaty, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties asks us to interpret 
a provision ‘in the light of its object and purpose’. Therefore, it is important to remind ourselves of 
the founding principles of the United Nations and, most importantly, of the Charter’s commitment in 
its preamble to ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. The very restrictive 
framework on the use of force is an integral part of this commitment, and allowing states to use 
military power based on the suspicion that something might have been caused by another state would 
be the opposite of this.  
 
4.2. Difficulty in detecting the intention of the attack 
It is not only difficult to detect the perpetrator of an attack, but also the intention of an attack. Again, 
the overlap with espionage, described in section 3.2, proves problematic. A cyber-attack uses a similar 
modus operandus to espionage and cybercrime.110 In all these cases, the most important part of the 
operation is to gain access to the other system. Failed attempts to do so would not appear different in 
most cases, and it is not unlikely that an exploitation attempt gone wrong could cause events that get 
interpreted as a cyber-attack. 
Again, Jensen believes that, given the danger and the imminence of cyber-attacks, attempting 
to find out the intent of the operation is too much to ask for, and the victim state should immediately 
have the right to self-defence.111 There is nothing in Article 2(4) or Article 51 that requires intent. 
Strictly speaking, a rocket fired by accident can constitute a use of force or an armed attack. However, 
the risk of accidents is much lower when it comes to conventional attacks. When it comes to the 
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computing world, a much wider range of failed espionage or cybercrime attempts could result in 
military force being used. Similar to the discussion in the previous subsection, Jensen’s positions as 
well as the more moderate opinions ignoring the intent of a cyber-attack would lead to a dangerous 
situation that is going against the object and purpose of the UN Charter. 
 
5. The over-hyped nature of the discussion 
 
In addition to examining the legal aspects of the cyber-attack phenomenon, it is also important to 
consider whether expanding the jus ad bellum framework is really as necessary as the authors of the 
Tallinn Manual and other writers make it out to be. 
 
5.1. Estonia 
One of the standing tropes of the cyber-genre is to start any discussion with reference to the 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks launched against Estonia in 2007. Even though many 
writers state that these incidents do not constitute a use of force (or an armed attack) under the effects 
doctrine,112 a lot of articles use the Estonian attacks as the starting point for their discussions or list 
them amongst the dangers that cyberwar can/will pose in the future.113 
In 2007, the already difficult relations between Russia and Estonia, and between Estonia and 
its significant Russian minority, became even more strained when the Estonian government decided 
to move the statue of a bronze Soviet Soldier to a less prominent location.114 This decision led to 
protests and riots by ethnic Russians within Estonia, who see the statue as a symbol of their wartime 
sacrifice.115 Shortly after this decision, the websites of a large number of Estonian institutions, 
including government ministries, banks, newspapers or political parties, came under attack, and were, 
as a result, inaccessible for multiple days,116 a hard blow for a strongly digitalised state like Estonia.117 
Understandably, Estonian officials were very concerned about the scale of cyber-attacks 
launched against their state’s digital infrastructure: the Minister of Defence stated that these attacks 
were ‘the first time that a botnet threatened the national security of an entire nation’,118 and the 
                                                 
112 See Tsagourias (n 5) 232. 
113 See, e.g. Woltag (n 21) para 1; Roscini (n 5) 4; Brown and Poellet (n 5) 130; Zielowski (n 6) 203; Hoisington (n 5) 
443; Schaap (n ) 123; Shackleford (n 5) 203. 
114 Ian Traynor, ‘Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia’, The Guardian (17 May 2002) 
www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia (accessed 24 August 2016). 
115 ‘Estonia and Russia: A Cyber-Riot’, The Economist (10 May 2007) www.economist.com/node/9163598 (accessed 24 
August 2016). 
116 Traynor (n 114). 
117 ‘Estonia and Russia: A Cyber-Riot’ (n 115). On the role of the internet in Estonia, see Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska and 
Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (2010) 
https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdfh, 16 et seq. (accessed 29 August 2016). 
118 Quoted in Davis (n 83). 
 
18 
Speaker of the Estonian Parliament even compared the attacks to nuclear explosions, stating she saw 
them as ‘the same thing’, because, ‘[l]ike nuclear radiation, cyberwar doesn't make you bleed, but it 
can destroy everything’.119 The spokesperson for the Estonian Ministry of Defence considered the 
country ‘lucky to survive this’.120 
NATO itself, despite its leaders dismissing the label of ‘war’ being applied to the attacks,121 
released a video that feeds into the notion of cyberwarfare. The video is full of cuts to experts, footage 
of uniformed soldiers sitting at computer screens, clips of everyday life in the streets that slowly get 
darker to dramatic music, and is called ‘War in Cyberspace’.122 While, besides the title, the video 
makes no mention of the word ‘war’ itself or of the alleged culprit – Russia – the message is clear: 
‘there is a real threat to people’s security’,123 ‘the effects could be devastating’,124 and ‘it’s absolutely 
essential that we employ collective defence’.125 
It is, however, less than clear that it really was the Russian government that was behind these 
attacks. To date, most evidence seems to suggest that it was, instead, ‘hacktivists’, unorganised groups 
of people acting out of their own initiative, as the Tallinn Manual itself states.126 The only person 
arrested for the act was a 22 year old Russian living in Estonia who was enraged about the decision 
to move the statue.127 If he was even more angry and had used explosives to vent this anger, we would 
be talking about a terrorist attack, and it is difficult to imagine that NATO would get involved to 
confront Russia in such a public way. 
Even if it the Russian government was clearly behind them, the reality of the attacks is less 
dramatic than suggested. A DDoS attack is not in any form comparable to a military attack in the way 
that the NATO video or the statements set out earlier in this section suggest. Generally, DDoS attacks 
are done by accessing a website or internet service from as many devices as possible, so that the 
webserver collapses under the amount of traffic. Often, attackers use botnets to commit these attacks 
– large amounts of previously compromised computers or devices that can be rented on the black 
market for a variety of purposes like these attacks or sending spam emails. The ever growing market 
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for poorly secured connected devices like smart fridges, digital weather stations or cheap routers 
makes sure that there is a wide range of potentially attacking machines available.128 
While attacks against Estonian government services in this way are worrying and problematic, 
they are very different from kinetic attacks. The well-known computer security expert Bruce Schneier 
stated in a debate that ‘it’s kind of like the army marches into your country and then gets in line at the 
motor vehicle bureau so you can’t get your driver’s license renewed’.129 Singer and Friedman 
compare it to bullying rather than to an act of war,130 and Benatar describes the attacks as ‘relatively 
primitive’.131 
With the exception of few authors, including Schmitt himself, who argues that the events 
‘arguably reached the use-of-force threshold’,132 many proponents of the effects doctrine agree that 
applying this doctrine will not lead to the assessment of these attacks as an armed attack or even a 
use of force.133 The statements given by politicians and the video from NATO show, however, how 
blurry the lines are in the eyes of decision makers. This is not helped by Shackleford’s assertion that 
this event could have led to legitimate self-defence ‘if the cyber attack succeeded in bringing the 
entire country to a halt, capsizing the economy, and unleashing widespread unrests, riots, and possibly 
deaths’.134 
It is important to recall that the actual effects of the attack were the temporary unavailability 
of a range of important websites. Nothing in the events suggests that damage occurred that was even 
remotely close to ‘bringing the entire country to a halt’ or to nuclear attacks as suggested by the 
Estonian government. The events caused an inconvenience and certainly should have been 
investigated from a criminal law perspective (as, indeed, they were), but they should not be 
considered as falling within the jus ad bellum framework of the United Nations. Nor should they 
serve as an excuse for expanding this framework. 
 
5.2. Stuxnet 
The situation is slightly different in the case of the Stuxnet worm. If the reports are true (and for the 
purpose of this article, this will be assumed), the United States and Israel managed to cause actual 
physical damage to the nuclear enrichment programme of Iran. A historic incident with a similar goal 
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in the past – the bombing of the Osirak reactor in Iraq by Israeli forces in 1981 – famously was 
condemned by the Security Council.135 
Stuxnet caused damage to the Iranian nuclear enrichment programme by manipulating the 
centrifuges via a worm (the standalone version of a computer virus). This highly sophisticated piece 
of software spread out by infiltrating Microsoft Windows machines first without causing any harm 
(in 2010, an estimated 100,000 machines were infected, the vast majority of them in Iran).136 Once it 
reached its target network, either accidentally or by deliberate infection through an insider, it tried to 
spread out via the local network or via USB storage media.137 On controlling units of certain Siemens 
centrifuges, the worm attempted to connect to a command-and-control-server over the internet or, on 
non-connected systems, executed its malicious code without looking for further instructions.138 
Besides spying on the nuclear programme, the worm caused the centrifuges to run at a higher 
speed than foreseen for extended periods of time, causing the machines to wear out and break, all 
while appearing perfectly normal on the control terminals.139 The exact damage is unknown, as the 
Iranian government has never disclosed exact numbers (President Ahmadinejad spoke about a 
‘limited number of centrifuges’ that had problems), but it is fairly certain that the Iranian nuclear 
programme was set back significantly.140 It is notable that Reuters has quoted a ‘U.S. intelligence 
source’ that a similar attack has been attempted, targeting the North Korean nuclear programme.141 
Besides being a clear case with actual physical damage, Stuxnet is also a rare example that 
can be relatively well traced to its origins, primarily based on the efforts used: the worm used four 
very costly zero day exploits (undiscovered security holes in software),142 and it is likely that its 
developers had access to the specific types of centrifuges used.143 It is unrealistic to assume that 
hacktivist groups or even most governments would have these capabilities.144 There are also reports 
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relying on anonymous government sources that confirm the widely held suspicions that the 
governments of the United States and Israel worked on this programme together,145 and there are a 
number of other indicators – a refusal to deny US involvement, suspicious smiles at press conferences 
and a video celebrating the Stuxnet success at the retirement party of an Israeli General, for example, 
that point towards these two states.146 
Because of the physical damage that was caused, some academics have concluded that the 
Stuxnet attacks constitute a violation of Article 2(4) UNC.147 Depending on which school of thought 
is followed, the effects could also be interpreted as being grave enough to constitute an armed attack, 
giving Iran the right to self-defence. Others, however, disagree, stating that the scale of the attack is 
not sufficient to constitute an armed attack.148 
Brown and Poellet make the comparison inherent in the effects doctrine and state that ‘[i]f the 
damage caused by the Stuxnet malware had instead been caused by a traditional kinetic attack, such 
as a cruise missile, it is likely Iran would have vigorously responded’.149 While this is true (if a 
vigorous response consists of less than starting military strikes against the United States), we can 
easily make a different analogy: if the same effect had been caused by an American spy or a 
bribed/persuaded Iranian, who worked covertly in Natanz and manipulated the centrifuge speeds, we 
would not discuss a war scenario. In fact, this scenario fits the actual events much better – a bombing 
of the Natanz facility would have very likely resulted in destroyed buildings and human casualties, 
not just in broken engines of centrifuges. 
Stuxnet, therefore, needs to be seen as a case of espionage and sabotage that would be below 
the de minimis threshold usually assumed by states, even below the less strict standard summarised 
in the espionage debate considered in subsection 3.2, as speeding up centrifuges cannot be construed 
as ‘projecting lethal force’.150 If the accusations are true, the United States and Israel certainly violated 
the principle of non-intervention, but, as explained previously, espionage is not caught by 
international law on the use of force. 
 
5.3. Other scenarios 
A lot of articles are very clear about the future: as bad as the attacks that have thus far occurred, such 
as those discussed in this section, are, we have not experienced the really bad consequences of cyber-
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attacks yet. The list of potential threats in various academic and journalistic articles reads like a 
dystopian science fiction novel. Typical narratives are that attackers can 
 
 interrupt the electricity supply151 
 interrupt communication lines152 
 derail trains153 
 steer airplanes off course,154 or crash them155 
 cause floods by opening a dam156 
 damage a state’s financial system and cause harm to its economy157 
 manipulate food and pharmaceutical products at production158 
 tamper with military communications or weapon systems159 
 and, as the ultimate threat scenario, cause a meltdown in a nuclear power plant.160 
 
Similar scenarios have been raised by former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who warns of a 
‘cyber-Pearl Harbor that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life, an attack that would 
paralyze and shock the nation and create a profound new sense of vulnerability’.161 
All of this sounds very scary and very real. If a foreign government blows up a nuclear power 
plant on the press of a button, killing millions of people, the urge to use all necessary means, including 
military power for self-defence is certainly understandable. 
However, it is less than clear that these scenarios are really as realistic as portrayed. Erik 
Gartzke, for example, has questioned the assumption that cyber doomsday scenarios are likely to 
occur. He has written that such envisaged scenarios are generally based on the ‘common fallacy in 
arguing from opportunity to outcome, rather than considering whether something that could happen 
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is at all likely, given the motives of those who are able to act’.162 Unless it comes as part of a general 
military attack, there are few strategic advantages that a cyber-attack would bring to the attacker.163 
It is also very difficult to use cyber-attacks as a form of threat or blackmail: most attacks are so 
difficult to execute that the threats would not be taken seriously unless the attacker reveals details – 
which would then make it easier to prevent the attack.164 
As pointed out in section 3 above, the cyber-attack scenarios are also not as new as suggested. 
Traditional espionage and sabotage can achieve most of the damages portrayed, and it can usually do 
so in a much more realistic and less costly way.165 A state’s train system, for example, will rarely have 
all its control units connected to the internet, and it will take a lot of insight and highly complex and 
costly malware to interfere with it. If the goal of an aggressor state is really to derail a passenger train, 
it would be much easier for it to send a spy to place a hidden obstacle on the tracks – the absence of 
such attacks in the past demonstrates that the danger of derailing trains due to cyber-attacks is not as 
overwhelming as many of the articles on the topic suggest. 
A more realistic scenario is that cyber-attacks are used as part of normal warfare – the so-
called ‘hybrid war’. It has been asserted, for example, that Israel used cyber-attacks to disable Syrian 
air defence before the bombing of Syrian nuclear enrichment facilities,166 and that Russia’s attack on 
Georgia in 2008 has been accompanied by cyber operations.167 In neither of these cases, however, 
would it be necessary to investigate the cyber-attacks further in order to establish if there have been 
violations of the prohibition of the use of force – they are both clear cases of the use of force (and of 
armed attacks) even without the launch of worms, viruses or other malware. This kind of hybrid 
warfare is also by no means a new scenario – it is not that dissimilar from the warriors that, according 
to legend, circumvented the Trojan defence system by hiding inside a wooden horse. 
Another scenario that is usually mixed into this debate, even though it is not a traditional 
military issue, is the theft of intellectual property and of government data. The US Department of 
Defence describes in its ‘Cyber Strategy’ at length how foreign states (especially China) can use 
cyber-attacks to steal intellectual property.168 There also have been a lot of reports about Chinese 
hacking on American government institutions in recent years. Newspapers and academics alike have 
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written about the Chinese Army breaking into computers of American military, government or 
industry,169 or about cyberwar capabilities being developed by the Chinese state.170 
When Chinese hackers allegedly stole American personnel files in 2015, journalists and 
government officials even used the Pearl Harbour comparison that has become a bit of a meme,171 
and a relatively moderate Republican Presidential candidate went on record stating that ‘China must 
pay a price’ for these incidents and the regular theft of intellectual property.172 
Similarly, the incidents surrounding Sony Pictures in November 2014 show the danger of the 
hype and how quickly government agencies can jump to blame states. When Sony Pictures was 
hacked and embarrassing emails of network executives were leaked, the FBI was quick to link the 
incidents to the North Korean government, especially since a group claiming to be the hackers 
threatened cinemas with bomb attacks should they show the film ‘The Interview’, an otherwise quite 
irrelevant comedy film mocking Kim Jong-Un.173 The problems with digital evidence described in 
subsection 4.1 are certainly true in this case as well. Security experts have criticised the ‘Trust Us’ 
mentality displayed by the FBI and the quick jump to conclusions based on circumstantial 
evidence.174 Independent analyses of the incidents disagree with the FBI and state that it is more likely 
the incidents were committed by ‘insiders pretending to be North Korea’.175 Nonetheless, the FBI 
was quick to state that the incident ‘reaffirms that cyber threats pose one of the gravest national 
security dangers to the United States’, and President Obama felt that it was necessary to point out that 
‘[w]e will respond, we will respond proportionally, and in a place and time that we choose’.176 
Regardless of whether we believe the FBI’s claims or not, ultimately we are talking about 
leaked emails between corporate executives and, in some cases, actors, which proved to be 
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embarrassing for Sony and the individuals concerned, and about vague bomb threats that never 
materialised. Claiming that this is in the category of the ‘gravest national security dangers to the 
United States’ and threatening a response shows the danger of the cyberwar hype. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The previous section has shown that the danger of a cyberwar is greatly overstated. The only attack 
outside an ongoing armed conflict listed in section 5 that comes even remotely close to the damage 
that could be caused by a military attack is the Stuxnet worm, and the complexity and amount of 
resources that went into it show that cyber-attacks of that dimension are not going to be common.177 
It is obvious that many actors in the area have a strong interest to paint a scary picture: 
contracts and research grants on cyberwar are a fast growing multi-million dollar industry, and the 
scarier everything looks, the more tax money is channelled into this industry. Journalists already 
warned about the ‘cyber industrial complex’ (or variations thereof),178 and describe an industry that 
is valued between 80 and 150 billion dollars annually.179 Newspapers need to be sold, and a headline 
that states ‘Individuals of Russian descend make Estonian servers inaccessible for a few days’ is not 
as helpful for that as ‘Russia attacks NATO country in cyberspace’, and ‘Companies need to improve 
network security to prevent data theft’ is not as exciting as ‘Cyber Pearl Harbour: are our nuclear 
power plants next?’. And governments seek ways to control the internet. The fear of foreign 
governments that try to attack our nuclear power plants over invisible channels is a fantastic way to 
justify that it is necessary to ‘re-engineer the Internet to make attribution, geo-location, intelligence 
analysis and impact assessment — who did it, from where, why and what was the result — more 
manageable’, as the former US Director of National Intelligence demanded.180 
It is important that scholars resist the temptation to join the choir of scandalous headlines, and 
instead consider the reasons for the relatively strict system of the laws on the use of force. Article 51 
UNC in particular is very narrow to make sure it cannot be abused. Opening up Article 51 to a form 
of attack that is almost impossible to attribute clearly would be a dangerous turn for international law. 
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Allowing states to lead a war based on thin technical evidence, maybe backed up by secret intelligence 
information, is almost asking for abuse. 
The language used is especially worrying. ‘Pearl Harbour’ refers not only to a major military 
attack that cost the lives of over 2,000 soldiers, but also to the event that was used to justify the 
American participation in the Second World War. Threatening with such a scenario implies the 
readiness for a major war fought based on incidents that are unlikely and nearly impossible to prove 
sufficiently. Rid rightly criticises the ‘alarmist’ tone of the debate,181 and O’Connell is correct when 
she criticises the militarised nature of the discussion that is often led by academics with ties to the 
military.182 
The effects doctrine plays into this hype and carries a high danger of abuse due to its practical 
problems when it comes to attribution. The Tallinn Manual is becoming an extremely influential 
document in international law, as the various cyber policies and the statements by politicians set out 
in this article’s introduction show – an influence that is only likely increase with the recent publication 
of the more extensive 2.0 version. It is important for scholars to resist the urge of taking this seemingly 
plausible doctrine for granted, and instead point to solutions outside the use of force when looking at 
cyberwar scenarios. 
The framework on the use of force is deliberately narrow and should not be expanded to 
confront an overstated threat. Issues like the use of economic or political force, espionage operations 
and damage caused under a certain threshold are rightly kept out of the use of force framework, and 
it would be not only inconsequential, but also dangerous to apply a different approach for computer 
network attacks. 
For world politics, the approach to this problem should instead be to prevent this kind of attack 
rather than to seek ways to punish it. Countermeasures and military measures as a deterrent are no 
replacement for improving computer security.183 While computer systems can never be entirely 
secure, it is possible to improve the security of the systems in use, and institutions like NATO or the 
United Nations could play a major role in this. Given many of the revelations by Edward Snowden 
about American software companies, it is increasingly obvious that the world needs software 
solutions and digital infrastructure that it can trust. These solutions will have to be developed by 
international teams and will have to be open source, so that every government agency and any private 
party is able to review their security. 
For a fraction of the money that is now made available to establish military cyber capabilities 
worldwide, international organisations could coordinate and sponsor such efforts by paying 
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developers to write or audit software. While there will always be a race between those fixing critical 
security bugs in software and those exploiting them, efforts like this would contribute more to ending 
the envisioned cyber threat scenarios than threats of military strikes in response can ever do. 
